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Abstract

This research project conducts an analysis of the current situation in Crimea and
attempts to contribute to the literature around a possible solution. Done so with the help
of geopolitical analysis, the history of the region of Crimea is examined in-depth in an
attempt to shed light on strategies for a resolution and provide background information.
Geopolitical analysis as a form of study is then briefly explained and its relevancy for
looking at global events and predicting outcomes explained. Next, three possible
strategies for a solution are then presented and their viability analyzed through a
geopolitical lens. These three strategies are: unilateral pressure and sanctions, multilateral
incorporation, and a shared sovereignty approach. This project concludes by arguing that
the best way to proceed towards a solution in Crimea is through a synthesis of all three
strategies, with an emphasis on multilateral incorporation.
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Introduction
The 2014 Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation is one of the most
important events in modern international relations. Not just for the international
precedents and laws that it broke, but for the ways in which it unfolded. As a zone that is
claimed in right by both Ukraine and Russia, while physically claimed solely by Russia,
Crimea serves as an extremely interesting case study to analyze for potential solutions.
The importance of a resolution in this case is seen in the truly international response to
the conflict in the region, and because of Russia’s position on the world stage. As the
global political landscape continues to shift from unipolar to multipolar, and from west to
east, the position of a vital military power like Russia will be crucial. The stability of both
the domestic region of Crimea as well as the international arena is greatly influenced by
Russia, so it is necessary for the sake of peace and stability that relations with global
powers are good. Currently, the situation in Crimea has caused international outcry,
which underscores the importance of a solution being worked towards soon. While it may
not be that simple, these ideas beg the question: how can the contestation of Crimea be
solved in the most stable and peaceful way possible?
In order to provide an informed view of potential solutions, this study first
examines the history of Russian-Ukrainian relations and how it eventually led to the 2014
annexation. This historical background is extremely vital when looking at the modern
perceptions of Russia and Ukraine by their own citizens as well as how they view one
another. If one wants to propose a resolution, these perceptions must be taken into
consideration. On a similar note, this project attempts to explain actions of various actors
using the tools of geopolitics. Geopolitics is a form of study that looks at political events
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in a broader way by evaluating the importance of factors such as geography, economics,
history, and others that are often forgot about in monocausal academic theories. Viewing
the case of Crimea in this way can provide a much more holistic view of the issue, which
in turn helps inform a possible solution. This study then examines three key proposed
resolution strategies: unilateral action, multilateral incorporation, and shared sovereignty.
After illustrating positive and negative aspects of each, this project concludes by arguing
that the best route towards a solution is a synthesis of all three, but with an emphasis on
multilateral incorporation. Based on the tools of geopolitical analysis, this is the most
realistic strategy for a resolution in Crimea and would lead to the most peace and
stability. The expected outcome of this study is to provide the reader with a more indepth understanding of contemporary Russian-Ukrainian relations through the lens of
Crimea, and to contribute to the dialogue surrounding how this contestation will be
resolved.
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Literature Review
Much of the English language literature surrounding Crimea, Russian-Ukrainian
relations, and Russian foreign policy is highly critical of Russia. This makes sense as the
west, namely the United States, has historically been hostile towards Russia. The
correctness of those with this view can be debated about at length, but a single
perspective is not beneficial for the sake of quality research. To attempt to balance the
western bias against Russia, this study sought out Russian and eastern European authors
who would have a different perspective. This helped to an extent, but overall the most
important aspect for diversity of opinion was finding sources with differing viewpoints,
regardless of the nationality of the author.
Overall, the literature found for this study served to illustrate the most popular
sentiments about how Crimea could be solved. These made their way into the paper as
the three ideas for a solution (unilateral, multilateral, and shared sovereignty). This
served as an important guiding tool for understanding what a realistic solution to the
conflict might look like. Along these lines, the sources highlighting specific international
law were greatly important for learning about the legality of the annexation. In addition,
the journals detailing the struggles of the Crimean Tatars and Ukraine’s idea of
nationalism were vital for understanding many of the underlying geopolitical issues that
caused tensions and led up to the annexation.
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Research Methodology
The research for this study was conducted mainly through a synthesis of primary
and secondary sources. The primary sources consisted of 5 in-person interviews with
various experts on the topic throughout Europe. These experts ranged from employees at
think tanks and government institutions to tenured professors at universities. The only
thing that tied them together was their experience on the topic at hand, and they served to
provide a wide array of perspectives that were crucial for my research. The backbone of
the research for this paper was made up of scholarly and peer-reviewed journals. Topics
varied from historical analyses, to arguments for a solution, to more objective recounts of
an event. All of the sources cited and referenced played a part in the conclusions of this
research.
The methods used to collect the data were mainly qualitative, with a few
quantitative graphs from the sources being used to support arguments or shed light on an
issue. For the topic of ethical considerations, the anonymity of interviewees was
respected if they requested it. Also, care was taken to not include any information or
quotes that jeopardize the job or safety of anyone involved, as many of the conflicts
discussed in this paper are ongoing.
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Analysis: Section I
“Between Russia and the West”
As a nation, Ukraine has always had a complicated identity. Only an independent
state since 1991, Ukrainian history is filled with ethnic and nationalistic ambiguities
fraught with intervention from their eastern neighbors. Knowledge of this complicated
national identity is vital for understanding how Crimea and conflicts in eastern Ukraine
can be solved, so it is first necessary to go back to the old history that led to the creation
of modern Ukraine.
Tracing back to the origin of Ukraine, even its name is a great example of the
confusing national identity of Ukrainians. It stems from the Russian word “okraina”,
which means periphery as seen from Moscow, and appeared only for the first time near
the end of the nineteenth century (Rykwin, 2014). Even this small linguistic etymology
serves to show the complicated nature of Ukraine’s identity, and has influenced attitudes
towards Russia since the nation’s inception. Another problem that exists at the heart of
Ukrainian identity is the wildly varied history of the lands that belong to modern Ukraine.
For example, Ukraine is made up of a multitude of different ethnic groups and peoples.
The west of the country has Austro-Hungarian and Polish roots and is often regarded as
the most nationalistic part of the country, “Russian is rarely spoken there” (Rykwin,
2014, pg. 120). The political capital of Ukraine, Kiev, is the historical capital of the
Kievan Rus’ and vital to the nation’s self-identity. Another example of such a place is
Crimea itself, which has historically been occupied by the Tatars, a Turkic ethnic group
native to the surrounding area. The Tatars see themselves as the only people truly native
to the region, and even the word for Crimea comes from the Tatar word “krym”, which
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means rock fortress (Wydra, 2003). After being a protectorate of the Ottoman empire for
a time, Crimea was conquered by Russia during the 18th century and existed as an
autonomous republic of Crimean Tatars within Russia all the way into the time of the
Soviet Union. It then stayed as part of Russia until Nikita Khrushchev offered the
peninsula to Ukraine in 1954 as a token of appreciation for the 300th anniversary of
Ukrainian union with Russia (Rykwin, 2014).
The complicated background of Crimea’s ownership and Ukraine’s identity has
made the current situation all the more understandable. Their history of a wide variety of
nations and peoples with vastly different cultures being amalgamated into one nation has
led to an extremely complex sense of nationalism. This is felt all throughout Ukraine, but
especially so in Crimea. Another crucial piece of the history of Crimea is the expulsion of
the Crimean Tatars by Joseph Stalin. Deported en masse by Stalin, and suspected by him
as German collaborators, the Crimean Tatars made up a sizable portion of the Ukrainian
population. Not allowed to return to Crimea until 1956, the Tatars have been slowly
attempting to reintegrate with the help of the Ukrainian government. In modern times
Crimean Tatars make up only about 10% of the population of Crimea, with ethnic
Ukrainians and Russians making up the rest (Chase, 1995). This abrupt loss of a major
ethnic group in Crimea brought about by Stalin’s policies has only further muddied the
ethnic identity of the region and gives another interesting perspective to its modern
dynamics. All of these factors in conjunction has caused Ukraine and Crimea to exist in a
confusing state “between Russia and the West” (Rykwin, 2014) with its identity
uncertain. With the foundations of the conception of Ukraine and Crimea addressed, it is
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then important to shift to the crucial period that acts as a stepping to stone from the
ancient to the modern notions of Crimea: The Soviet era.
Soviet Relations & the 21st Century
The Soviet era was an extremely important time for Crimea, and it underpins
many of the policies and justifications given for the 2014 annexation of the region by
Russia. In order to understand the contemporary period of Russian-Ukrainian relations, it
is vital to learn about this period. The first important point to note is regarding the way in
which Crimea and Ukraine existed within the Soviet Union. During this time,
“designations of both borders and regional status within the former Soviet Union was
largely arbitrary and, where it was not arbitrary, it was deliberately designed to dilute the
power of local populations” (Chase, 1995, pg. 222). This sort of jumbling of ethnic and
national identities into the Soviet sphere caused a confusion of identity in many countries
in the eastern bloc, especially Ukraine. Also notable in this period was the briefly
mentioned above rise of the Stalinist line of thinking, which led to the deportation of the
indigenous Crimean Tatars from their homeland. This thinking was extremely pervasive
during the time of the Soviet Union and has become very difficult to root out in the
region even to this day.
Another important development during the Soviet period was Russia’s promotion
of the Russkii Mir, or Russian World, in Ukraine. The goal of this investment was to
provide “a group identity to Russian speakers and peoples who associate with Russian
culture and language” (Kuzio, 2015, pg. 159). This promotion of Russian culture and
identity was crucial to creating the divided ethnic and cultural climate that exists within
modern Ukraine. In addition to this, other Russian policies during the Soviet period also

12

contributed to hostility between the nations. Most notably, the 1933 artificial famine in
the Soviet Union which most Ukrainians view as a genocide and are extremely bitter
towards (Kuzio, 2015). This is another example of one of the many policies that has led
to hostilities from both countries and goes to show how the 2014 annexation was
anything but a random fluke. Around this time period Ukraine was also briefly occupied
by the Nazis beginning in 1941. During this time the Ukrainians were initially even
friendly towards the Germans due to their distaste for Stalin’s policies in the 20’s and
30’s (Rykwin, 2014). This showcases a tangible, historical example of the dissonance
between Russia and Ukraine and how often this difference of opinion manifested itself
politically.
This leads to the discussion of an oft-overlooked aspect of Ukraine’s selfconception. Simply, the way in which the country won its independence. Having not ever
been a country with a uniform identity that answered to no one, Ukraine as a nation was
historically always subject to a greater power. Whether this was the Ottoman and AustroHungarian empire, or more recently with the Soviet Union, Ukraine has almost always
existed as a subject state. When its independence was finally won in 1991, it happened
not because of a violent revolution or overthrow of its masters like many countries which
gained their independence in the 20th century. But rather, it was thrusted upon them due
to “the deterioration of government infrastructure in Moscow and the sapping of the
strength of the will to rule” (Rykwin, 2014, pg. 122), alongside the other factors such as
gross mismanagement and economic failure that led to the Soviet Union’s collapse.
‘Winning’ their independence in this way was very important to the national psyche of
Ukraine. Instead of being a united front following their independence, Ukraine was a
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muddied mix of ethnic and national identities due to its diverse history and had never
truly ruled itself in the modern sense. These factors together left Ukraine and Crimea
vulnerable to intervention in the post-Soviet era and provide a clearer image to how the
lead-up to the 2014 annexation of Crimea happened.
Lead-up to the 2014 Annexation
From the time of Ukraine’s independence in 1991 to the annexation of Crimea in
2014, a great number of crucial policies and actions took place. When taken with the
background knowledge of the history of the region, they provide a holistic view of the
crisis in Crimea and eastern Ukraine that can hopefully inform how to approach a
solution.
The first example of such a development was the talk of retaking Crimea for
Russia that began as early as the 1990’s. Even though Ukraine had very recently gained
its independence, conservative politicians in Russia were already ready to “argue for the
forceful restoration of Crimea to Russian control” (Hopf, 2016, pg. 230). However, at the
time, this was not the commonly held belief within Russia. Centrist discourse seemed to
be prevailing for a time, riding on the pro-democratic wave felt throughout Europe after
the collapse of the Soviet Union. But, by the early 2000’s this was already beginning to
fade as Russian conservatism began to rise again. One of the catalysts that has been
argued to be the reason for this was the United States’ withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic
Missile treaty (ABM) in 2001 and subsequent NATO expansion eastward. Marc Finaud,
head of Arms Proliferation at the Geneva Center for Security Policy (GCSP), describes
this treaty as “a means of deterring second-strike capability”. Many viewed the signing of
this treaty as a sign of future cooperation between the United States and Russia in the

14

post-Soviet era, and Finaud also argues that the withdrawal from this treaty contributed to
the modern climate of mistrust that exists between the nations. Those with rose-colored
glasses hoping for an extended union between Russia and the west soon realized that
these factors “demonstrated that an alliance with the United States was impossible” and
that “Russians who expected a sense of shared vulnerability were quickly disabused of
this possibility” (Hopf, 2016, pg. 232). This was in line with the idea that NATO-Russia
relations were built on the false premise that “Russia was on a path toward sharing and
integrating Western values fundamental to the post–Cold War Alliance transformation”
(François, 2012, pg. 5). It has been argued that these actions which caused Russia to feel
spurned by the West were the main reason discourse in Russia shifted from the Centrist
view of collaboration with the West to manage global affairs, to the Conservative view of
working with powers like China to balance the United States and the West (Hopf, 2016).
When seen from this perspective, Russia’s attempts to level the playing field and project
influence begin to make more sense.
Another vital development that happened shortly after the dissolution of the
Soviet Union was attempts by the newly created Russian Federation to keep former
Soviet countries in line with political and institutional tools. The backbone of this tactic
was the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) which was meant to check the
power of foreign-policy decisions in the former Soviet states. This is best seen in Article
One of the CIS Charter, which stated “participating states will not enter into military
alliances or participate in any groupings of states, nor in actions directed against another
participating state” (Götz, 2016, pg. 307). Tensions quickly rose as Ukraine only agreed
to the deal after making a multitude of amendments and refusing to allow Russia basing
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rights on the Crimean Peninsula. Russia would not budge, however, and by 1997
agreements were in place for Russia to lease a group of naval facilities on Crimea in
return for Russia reducing Ukraine’s crippling energy debt by roughly $500 million USD
(Götz, 2016). Although seen as a minor victory for Russia at the time, this was a massive
step for their power projection in Crimea that would eventually pave the way for the
ruthlessly efficient annexation of the peninsula in 2014.
As relations between Ukraine, Russia, and the West continued to evolve into the
2000’s, so too did Russia’s tactics for influencing the region. Using cutting-edge
technological advancements, the bulk of these tactics were about Russia exerting soft
power techniques in the region. Most notably, a digital disinformation campaign meant to
sow discord and divide the people of Ukraine. Thinking such as this is in line with
historical Russian tactics of ‘plausible deniability’ that seeks to not seem responsible for
a usually illegal action and “where the result is to influence decision-making in a
direction favourable or at least not harmful to the Kremlin” (Cormac & Aldrich, 2018,
pg. 484). This was mainly used in the aftermath of the 2014 annexation in order to
attempt to control the narrative (Golovchenko, et. al, 2018), but it was also seen in the
lead up to the annexation. Dialogue in this manner goes back to the views of Russian
ultranationalists in the 1990’s, who attempted to argue that Ukraine has no right to even
exist as a sovereign state (Kuße, 2018). Although admittedly an extreme example, it still
goes to show how contentious and belittling the relationship between the two nations is.
Something even as simple as the mere existence of the country of Ukraine is questioned
by those in Russia and informs why so many there see it as a natural step to eventually
retake Crimea.
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Arguably the most important event that happened in region during this time was
the Euromaidan protests of 2013, and it was truly then that things quickly spiraled into
the situation that exists today. Briefly, although it could easily be multiple papers on its
own, Euromaidan needs to be explained in order to understand contemporary ideas of
nationalism and identity in Ukraine. In November of 2013, then Ukrainian President
Viktor Yanukovych announced Ukraine would not be signing an association agreement
with the EU that had been negotiated for years and was seen as a steppingstone to fullfledged EU membership. This move was wildly unpopular with the people of Ukraine
who desperately wanted closer ties with Europe rather than Russia, and it did not help
public sentiment that the decision not to sign came with a $15 billion loan from Russia
(Biersack & O’Lear, 2014). Soon protests and demonstrations began to grow in Kiev
around the popular square of Maidan and very quickly ramped up in size and intensity.
This, along with the pro-EU sentiment of the protests led to the movement gaining its
namesake (Diuk, 2014). What started as a protest of a few hundred and eventually
thousands of students, became a nationwide movement after Yanukovych ordered the use
of extreme force on protestors unlike anything the country had seen before. It is estimated
that nearly 700,000 Ukrainians took to the streets on December 1st of that year, and by the
end of February 2014 Yanukovych had fled the country and a new government had been
installed. Spurned by the loss of a friendly government, Russia soon put the soft-power
techniques on the back burner and began preparations for “setting events in motion that
led to the annexation of Crimea” (Biersack & O’Lear, 2014, pg. 248). Tensions in the
region had reached a boiling point, and it was now time for Russia act in the way they
know best: military force.
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Annexation
Once preparations were made and action was taken, things began to move very
quickly. Following the expulsion of President Yanukovych from Ukraine, pro-Russian
demonstrations began in the Crimean city of Sevastopol on February 23rd. By the 27th of
the same month, masked Russian troops with no insignia took over the Crimean
parliament (Weaver, 2015), and began to take over strategic sites all over Crimea. This
led to an eventual referendum of the Crimean people on March 16th simply asking the
choice between 2 options: “Do you support the reunification of the Crimea with Russia as
a subject of the Russian federation?” and “Do you support the restoration of the
Constitution of the Republic of Crimea of 1992 and the status of the Crimea as part of
Ukraine?” (Grant, 2015, pg. 68-69). However, a declaration of independence for Crimea
was already adopted on March 11th. Following the referendum, the Russian Federation
Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights posted an analysis on their
website estimating between 50-60% in favor of the first option on the referendum, and
that at least 30% but no more than 50% of eligible people voted (Grant, 2015). However,
the official tally that was reported ended up saying 96.77% were in favor of the first
option, and that 83% of eligible voters voted. There is a clear disconnect here, but in any
case by this point Crimea was already clearly in Russia’s hands militarily. The
“referendum” that was conducted contains many questions regarding its validity, but it is
much more important as a tool for understanding how Russia attempted to justify its
annexation of Crimea on the world stage.
Russia was able to take Crimea so quickly and successfully due to a plethora of
reasons. Many of which can be seen when looking at the history of relations between
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Russia and Ukraine, and the groundwork that was laid long ago. First, and arguably most
importantly, was the military aspect. The 1997 deal that allowed Russia to have bases in
Crimea gave them the advantage of already having an active military force in the region.
This, coupled with the geography of Crimea being very far away from Ukraine’s capital
alongside their already weak military, allowed for Russia to take Crimea in an extremely
quick and efficient manner with basically no resistance. The aspect of receiving little
resistance is a result of the complicated ethnic identity of Crimea, which contains a large
number of ethnic Russians. Also of note here is Crimea’s former history as a Russian
subject, and the neo-Stalinist policies of Russia in the 2000’s that brought about nostalgia
for these times among many people in Crimea. The sham referendum of March 2014 was
not for Russia, but to attempt to provide some legal basis for the annexation to the West.
Russia already controlled the region politically, militarily, and to a large extent,
culturally. This, in tandem with all the rich history of the region mentioned above, shows
why a purely legal approach to solving Crimea is “blind to many important (non-legal)
aspects of a conflict” (Feldbrugge, 2014, pg. 96). For this reason, it is vital that when
approaching suggestions for a solution in Crimea we take into account the history and
non-conventional aspects that led to the crisis, which is best done by viewing it through a
geopolitical lens.
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Analysis: Section II
A Geopolitical Lens
In the modern, hyper-globalized world states with vastly different sets of values
interact more than ever before. To be able to properly understand how and why states
interact in the way that they do, and hopefully reach solutions to international crises, it is
crucial to adopt a more holistic perspective. One field of study that is useful for this is
Geopolitics. Geopolitics can be defined as “the examination of interactions between
political processes and geographic spaces in which these processes take place” (Csurgai,
2019, pg. 4). Rather than being understood as a separate social science, geopolitics aims
to incorporate various methods of analysis that exist within multiple fields of social
science. These can include factors such as history, culture, economics, geography, human
geography, and others. Whereas popular monocausal theories such as realism and
Marxism view problems through the lens of generally one issue, in this case military
strength and economics respectively, geopolitics aims to take a step back and view issues
from a wider angle.
In order to attempt to solve a dispute with the rich history and contention of the
crisis in Crimea, this type of geopolitical perspective is necessary. The reason for this is
that it gives a more nuanced look at the goals of the actors involved. Another main aspect
of geopolitics is its focus on understanding the ‘strategy of actors’ (Csurgai, 2019). By
broadening one’s perspective to see the issue from a multitude of viewpoints, it can be
much easier to begin to propose viable solutions. This is felt particularly in the case study
of Crimea, where realistic solutions coupled with the requisite historical background are
vital for moving towards a resolution.
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In the following three subsections, three possible solutions will be presented for
solving the situation in Crimea. Positive and negative aspects of each solution will be
weighed, and their viability seen through a geopolitical lens. This section will serve to
illuminate the varied possibilities for a resolution, and lead to a conclusion that suggests
the best path forward.
Proposed Solution I: Unilateral Action
The first possible resolution to the situation in Crimea would mean going down
the current path that is being taken and at the same time doubling down on it as the only
option. This path is one of unilateral pressure on Russia to cede Crimea back to Ukraine
through international pressure, sanctions, and non-recognition of Crimea as Russian..
This tactic is currently the most popular, but its effectiveness for a peaceful solution in
the long run is questionable.
The positive aspect of this strategy is sanctions without a doubt hurt Russia. It is
argued by some that sanctions themselves are not enough, and while that can be debated
at length, Dr. Karel Svoboda of Charles University in Prague notes that sanctions make
things legitimately difficult for Russia, and that they have consequences. When asked
how he sees the view that sanctions mean little to Russia, Dr. Svoboda says, “it’s
nonsense”. This view has proven to be true, as history shows that sanctions are always
extremely harmful for the GDP of the target country (Giumelli, 2017). This fact has led
many scholars to argue that continued sanctions and unrelenting pressure on Russia are
the best way to move forward towards a resolution. One of these scholars is Dr. Jan Šír,
also of Charles University. Dr. Šír argues that unilateral sanctions towards Russia is the
best policy, as well as the important factor of non-recognition. The policy of non-
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recognition means that states refuse to recognize Crimea as belonging to the Russian
Federation. This makes it very difficult for Russia to coordinate things in Crimea and
allow people to live normally there because of the state of ‘legal limbo’ it is perpetually
in. The logic behind this thinking is that with continued, unrelenting pressure through
these mediums Russia will eventually have to relent and give up. However, it is naïve to
think it will be this easy, so it is necessary to examine the drawbacks of such a plan.
First and foremost, sanctions are never as cut and dry or one-sided as much of
current political discourse suggests. Sanctions are basically war but in an economic sense,
and war both militarily and economically is harmful for all parties involved (Giumelli,
2017). Russia is a major trade partner with the EU especially in the field of oil, so
exerting sanctions on a major partner is likely to hurt both parties. Studies found that in
the time since EU sanctions on Russia began after the annexation of Crimea, imports and
exports to and from Russia unsurprisingly decreased (Giumelli, 2017). By losing out on a
solid chunk of trade with an important power, these statistics provide an argument for
why sanctions are not the long-term answer for a solution. However, it is important to
note that this same study also found that overall exports for EU countries has increased
during this same time period due to an increase in exports to other countries (Giumelli,
2017). So, while for now the EU seems to not have been hurt as bad in comparison by
their imposition of sanctions, the very nature of Russia as a crucial trading partner brings
into question the viability of unilateral sanctions in the long term.
After analyzing the pros and cons of exerting unilateral sanctions and policies
such as non-recognition as a possible solution, it is also vital to view the likelihood of this
strategy’s success through a geopolitical lens. Geopolitically, the view that unilateral
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action towards Russia is the only option is a very Western view that does not take into
account the Russian perspective. This is because geopolitics focuses on taking a broader
view that incorporates a multitude of perspectives. Regardless of who is “right” in a
conflict, if a solution is ever to be reached there must be compromise and understanding
from both sides. Going back to the Russian perception of being spurned by NATO and
the United States after the withdrawal from the ABM treaty and eastern encroachment by
NATO, it is unlikely that continued actions like this will lead to any sort of a solution.
The geopolitical background of section I gave insight to the Russian mindset, and with
this in mind, it is hard to imagine them ever conceding Crimea if there are no concessions
from the other side. When seen from this view, another type of solution for Crimea is
brought to mind that focuses more on cooperation.
Proposed Solution II: Multilateral Incorporation
After examining the positives and negatives of a unilateral pressure focused
strategy, it is important to highlight a perspective that is more cooperation based. This
method is one of multilateral incorporation. As a potential resolution strategy,
multilateralism suggests a broader incorporation of Russia in European and international
treaties and discussions. This is done in the hope that easing the tensions this way will
lead to Crimea being resolved in a much less hostile way. However, as with any potential
solution strategy, this comes with benefits and drawbacks.
First, an undoubtedly positive aspect of multilateral incorporation is it is much
more understanding of the Russian perspective. As discussed above, compromise is
absolutely vital for an international agreement and multilateral incorporation leaves room
for the softening of tensions in the region. A Europe that attempts to coexist with Russia
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is likely to be much more prosperous than one that attempts to shut out a major power in
the region. Even ignoring the economic aspect, European security and stability is
influenced by Russia in a major way. Based on their history, a spurned and unhappy
Russia is likely to lash out in a military capacity. It has even been argued that these exact
“liberal delusions” of the success of unilateral policies are what provoked Putin and
Russia to annex Crimea in the first place (Mearsheimer, 2014). Therefore, a multilateral
approach that involves including Russia in Western security and economic treaties is
likely to boost both the stability and economy of both parties, as well as ease tensions
when approaching the topic of Crimea. Under this umbrella of multilateral cooperation
from a security standpoint, Dr. Marc Finaud also has some suggestions for how this could
play out. First, he suggests a restoring of military to military communication between
Russia and EU member states. Also, adoption of measures to share information about
troop movements. Legislation such as this promotes a healthy amount of discourse
between Russia and the West as well as working to avoid another similar type of
annexation due to the rapid troop movements used when taking Crimea. It would also
serve to mitigate this “climate of mistrust” that Dr. Finaud discussed earlier. However, it
may be this exact climate that makes the dream of multilateralism involving Russia an
unlikely one.
The main drawback of attempting a multilateral approach when resolving Crimea
is that it assumes Russia wants to act in their own best interest and solve the situation.
This is a problem with many political science theories: that they assume actors act
rationally. A multilateral approach would also assume that Russia respects the rules of the
game and the international system, but it can be argued the annexation of Crimea is all
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the proof one needs to say that they do not respect the system. If Russia is suddenly
incorporated into a wide array of multilateral treaties, who is to say that they do not jump
ship the second they see something they do not like? Dr. Šír states that “Russia is
unhappy with the rules” of the current system, and that their military-focused mindset is
simply incompatible with the current make up of international relations. For this reason,
he and many other scholars are extremely pessimistic about the prospects of a successful
long-term union between Russia and the West. In the same vein Amanda Paul, leader of
the Ukraine Forum at the European Policy Centre (EPC) in Brussels, has even gone so far
as to say, “Crimea will never be resolved”. This pessimism about Russia’s place in the
modern international system is very common, and it makes it that much more
complicated to predict what will happen next.
Overall, multilateral incorporation is a resolution strategy that drastically differs
from its unilateral counterpart. Focusing on cooperation rather than isolationist pressure,
multilateralism seeks to bring about a solution via the easing of tensions between Russia
and the West. When examined through a geopolitical lens, multilateralism’s viability is
held up by the fact that it is more understanding of Russia’s perspective than
unilateralism. History and geopolitics show us that diplomatic solutions cannot be
reached without compromise, and multilateralism accounts for this. However, geopolitics
also cautions one to view an issue in a realistic way that takes into account historical
precedent and cultural attitudes. If multilateralism as a solution is viewed in this way, it
would be easy for one to argue that there is no precedent that Russia would be
cooperative in the current international system. For this reason, it is important to consider
an additional possible resolution for Crimea: a shared sovereignty approach.
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Proposed Solution III: Shared Sovereignty
With both a unilateral and multilateral approach leaving something to be desired,
it is necessary to examine the viability of a more unconventional resolution strategy. In
this case, shared sovereignty. This would entail a system in which political
responsibilities would be shared amongst multiple parties and allow for some sort of
clarity to an essentially-contested zone.
In the case of Crimea, a shared sovereignty approach would involve a sit down of
both parties from Russia and Ukraine, and a hashing out of terms on what they each can
control. These types of systems are predicated on the idea that both parties have
something to gain from sitting down with one another, and in this case it would be the
stability of the region. Both parties also believe they have an intrinsic right to the region,
whether that is based on sociopolitical or historical grounds (Núñez, 2017), which makes
the possibility of dialogue legitimate in this scenario. It is feasible to imagine a “one
state, two systems” type of agreement if viewed through this lens, similar to what exists
between China and Hong Kong. A concession of this sort would likely reduce hostility
towards Russia in the international community and allow for the people of Crimea to stop
living in this confusing legal in-between state.
However, the prospects of this proposition happening are quickly shot down when
the situation is viewed through a geopolitical lens. There is no compelling reason for
Russia to concede to Ukraine in such a way, because as of right now they hold all of
Crimea militarily. A dialogue such as the one proposed above is mostly a fanciful utopian
ideal that does not seem to be in line with the way Russia operates. Unless this

26

hypothetical dialogue comes with an extra bargaining chip from Ukraine, it is unlikely
that Russia would see any reason to sit down at the table.
In summary, the proposition of egalitarian shared sovereignty is an
unconventional suggestion for a resolution in Crimea and is important to the discussion
surrounding the issue for this reason. If a real solution is to be reached, innovative and
different ideas must be considered. While a geopolitical analysis would say that Russia
would probably never agree to a system like this, it provides an important example of a
different type of solution to Crimea. The 2014 annexation of Crimea was unlike any
event that has been seen recently in the world of modern international relations, and the
last 5 years have shown that simply unilateral pressure has not been enough to solve the
crisis in the region. If one wants to resolve a truly unprecedented event, then a unique
solution is required as well. In the case of Crimea, this would mean a synthesis of all
three proposed solutions, as well as the viewpoint of a geopolitical analyst.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, the crisis in Crimea is an extremely complicated issue, and one that
is largely unprecedented in the contemporary world of international relations. In order to
adequately examine the issue and work towards a solution, it is necessary to research the
topic in-depth and gain new perspectives. An extremely valuable tool for doing this can
be done through geopolitical analysis. An interdisciplinary method of research combining
multiple fields of study, geopolitics seeks to gain a wider understanding of international
affairs. Notably among these fields are the ideas of culture and history. By examining the
history of Ukraine, Crimea, and Russian-Ukrainian relations as a whole, geopolitics tells
us that one can have a much more informed view of a problem when approaching
resolution strategies from different perspectives. Three main strategies for a solution are
at the forefront of this research: unilateral pressure, multilateral incorporation, and shared
sovereignty. Based on the findings of this research, the best path forward is an
incorporation of all three, with an emphasis on multilateral incorporation. Any single
attempt to solve Crimea will be futile, because geopolitics shows that global political
issues are complex and nuanced. Therefore, by incorporating the best aspects of the
above three resolution strategies with an emphasis on multilateral incorporation, then the
crisis in Crimea may eventually cease.
Geopolitically, multilateral incorporation has the least amount of glaring flaws.
This stems from the idea that the background information provided in Section I allows for
a more nuanced look at the Russian perspective. For example, the idea that Russia’s
perception of being betrayed by NATO and Western powers has led to their closed off
approach and antagonistic behavior. Much of contemporary Western literature is
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immediately critical of anything Russia does (Kropatcheva, 2012), and while this may be
fair in some instances, if a solution is to be reached then all perspectives must be
understood. An approach with an emphasis on multilateral incorporation would likely
work best for making headway on a real solution because it is the friendliest to Russia. It
can be debated ad nauseum whether or not Russia deserves to be invited back to the table
because of their behavior, of if they would even come were they offered. But, this
research is meant to offer an answer for the best route to an actual solution rather than say
who is morally right and wrong. It cannot be denied that Russia broke a large number of
international laws and precedents with their annexation of the Crimean Peninsula (Burke
White, 2014). For this reason, unilateral sanctions should still be instituted to a certain
extent because this research shows that they definitely impact Russia. However, they
should not be the only strategy. In addition, an attempt to find some sort of common
ground between Russia and Ukraine, potentially rooted in cultural heritage, in a sort of
quasi-shared system may be fanciful but not off the table. Overall, this paper is meant to
showcase that there is no one single answer to an issue as complicated as Crimea. With
the help of geopolitical analysis and a thorough understanding of the conflict, a solution
can be proposed that may provide stability to the region. In this case, a solution that
promotes understanding and cooperation through multilateral incorporation, as well as
features of unilateral sanctions and shared sovereignty.
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